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REP Token: Tokenomics for Curating and Organizing Compute from Scratch

     Republic, like all cryptoeconomically secured public ledgers, will have a native token that is designed to both reward individuals who are contributing compute to the network and to act as a medium of exchange between participants in the network. REP, the name of the unit we are using to denominate this currency, is at its core an incentive: an incentive for validators securing the network, an incentive for validators providing compute, and a mechanism to accrue value natively. REP allows Republic to be an independent economy, rather than a simple marketplace. It also allows for the native coordination of a currency, permitting the net resources of a collective to be dedicated to individual causes that will benefit the network as a whole. In this post, we will dive deeper into how we envision REP to function, and where we see it going.  

               

     REP will be a minted token, largely as a result of Republic's Delegated Proof of Stake consensus mechanism. Republic is a quasi independent project: we have not made any formal allocations to any individual or investor beforehand, and will be dedicating tokens via a public presale for interested participants and a mint for the core contributors. REP's core utility is to serve as an incentive. Validators within the consensus protocol will be iteratively rewarded in exchange for securing the network. This is a two tier process, again due to the nature of the consensus mechanism. Individual participants delegate their REP to candidate validators, who are then selected based on a combination of the tokens delegated to them, the tokens they themselves have, and their past behavior as a validator. When a validator receives rewards at the conclusion of an individual block, it allocates a portion of it to the participants who voted for them, and keeps the rest.

     This initial allocation strategy is not without historical precedent. If computational power is the crude oil of the 21st century, then Republic is the entity designed to refine, organize, and export this essential commodity on a global scale. In a similar vein, historical industrial giants like Standard Oil first organized a fragmented and chaotic market through the strategic allocation of equity to key partners and early backers. This consolidation of capital and resources was necessary to build the vast infrastructure required for mass distribution. Likewise, Republic's initial token distribution to core contributors and presale participants serves a similar purpose: to bootstrap the foundational layer of a new digital economy and align the incentives of the key actors who will build and secure the infrastructure for this new, essential commodity.

     REP also acts as a unit of exchange. When a participant seeks to purchase compute from the network, they must put up a minimal amount of REP in exchange, depending on the quality of compute they are seeking. The same goes for compute providers. A compute provider has to provide a bond when signing up to the network; a bond that can be lost if their compute is not consistent or times out when being accessed by the participant. This bond is not merely a barrier to entry but the foundation of the network's cryptoeconomic security for its primary use case. It is the collateral that underwrites the quality of service, ensuring that participants engaging with the compute marketplace have a strong economic guarantee of performance.

     This leads to one of the core primitives of the Republic network: reputation-based slashing. Unlike traditional slashing mechanisms that are triggered solely by verifiable cryptographic faults such as double-signing, Republic's model is more holistic. It couples the quantitative reputation score of a validator with a stake-cutting mechanism that progressively removes economic weight from persistently underperforming or malicious actors. A slash event can be triggered by several conditions. These include standard consensus faults like equivocation, but more importantly, they encompass compute misconduct. If a provider's performance ratio drops below a minimum acceptable threshold for a set number of consecutive jobs, their bond is subject to slashing. Furthermore, a validator's stake can be slashed if their overall reputation score degrades below a critical protocol-defined threshold. This system ensures that slashing is not just a punishment for catastrophic failure but also a deterrent against sustained, low-quality service. It transforms the bond from a static security deposit into a dynamic measure of a provider's ongoing commitment to the network's health and performance.

     The reputation score itself is a critical component of our economic design, creating a powerful feedback loop that aligns incentives. A validator's reputation is a continuously calculated scalar value, updated after every compute job they perform. Good experiences, defined by low latency, high uptime, and delivered performance that meets or exceeds their benchmarked commitment, result in an increased reputation score. This score is not a vanity metric; it is a direct input into the weighted, randomized algorithm used to select the consensus committee for each epoch. Consequently, validators who provide reliable, high-quality compute are more likely to be selected to propose blocks and earn consensus rewards. This increased earning potential makes them more attractive to delegators, who then stake their REP with these high-performing validators, further increasing their selection weight and reward share. This creates a virtuous cycle where economic incentives directly promote the core function of the network: the provision of reliable, decentralized compute.

     We will discuss slashing and the core consensus protocol in a future post; for now, assume that there is a unilateral, black box function that dictates the supply of REP tokens at any given point in time. This function is dependent on the global emissions rate, the behavior of individual validators, and the amount of tokens being used to purchase or exchange compute natively. The monetary policy is designed to be adaptive. It must be calibrated to provide sufficient rewards to secure the network and incentivize a robust pool of compute providers, while also ensuring the long-term sustainability and value accrual of the REP token. The total supply is influenced by several factors: programmatic issuance of new tokens as block rewards, the recycling of transaction fees from both payment and compute transactions, and the potential for a deflationary mechanism through the burning of a portion of slashed tokens. This creates a balanced economic system where the token supply dynamically responds to network activity and security conditions. Ultimately, the tokenomics of REP are engineered to create a self-sustaining, self-regulating economy where the pursuit of individual economic gain by validators and delegators directly contributes to the security, reliability, and overall value of the Republic network.